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Some  central  banks  have  a  reputation  for  being  secretive.  A  justification  for  that 
behavior that we find in the literature is that being transparent about its operations and 
beliefs  hinders the central bank in  achieving  the best outcome. In other words,  a 
central  bank  needs  flexibility  and  therefore  cannot  be  fully  transparent.  Using  a 
forward-looking New-Keynesian model, we find exactly the opposite. A central bank 
that  is  conservative  improves  output  stabilization  by  being  transparent  about  the 
procedures it uses to assess the economy and, especially, about the forecast errors it 
makes. Under certain conditions transparency by a conservative central bank also 
improves interest rate stabilization. We also find that higher transparency makes it 
optimal  for  the  central  bank  to  be  more  conservative  as  the  benefits  from  higher 
transparency in terms of output stabilization are greater the more conservative the 
central bank is.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Monetary policy makers broadly agree that communication is a very important part of 
their business. Communication gives central bankers a tool to shape private sector 
expectations, which are crucial for effective monetary policy. 
Blinder (1998) argues that openness and communication with the public improve the 
effectiveness  of  monetary  policy  as  a  macroeconomic  stabilizer  because: "Central 
banks generally control only the overnight interest rate, an interest rate that is relevant 
to virtually no economically interesting transactions. Monetary policy has important 
macroeconomic effects only to the extent that it moves financial market prices that 
really matter – like long-term interest rates, stock market values, and exchange rates."  
In  theoretical  models  of  monetary  policy  one  often  assumes  an  informational 
asymmetry between the central bank and the private sector. Most of the times, the 
central  bank  has  an  informational  advantage  when  it  sets  its  policy.  However,  as 
Cukierman (2001) remarked at least theoretically, the issue of whether it is desirable 
to communicate central bank forecasts is far from being settled. A reading of the 
literature shows that the social desirability of communicating to the public any private 
information possessed by the central bank depends very much on the specific nature 
of the information. For example Faust and Svensson (1999) consider a case where the 
central bank has shifting objectives about its employment target and conclude that 
making this available to the public is socially desirable. Geraats (1999) also reaches at 
similar conclusion for the case where the central bank has private information about 
its inflation target. On the other hand in a model where the central bank has private 
information  about  upcoming  shocks,  Cukierman  (2001)  has  shown  that  advance 
communication of central bank forecasts reduces social welfare. Taking a different 
direction, Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and Schaling (2000) demonstrate that transparency 
about  central  bank’s  inflation-output  preferences  depends  on  the  degree  of  the 
credibility problem (leading to inflationary bias) relative to the stabilization problem 
(i.e. the need for flexibility to react to shocks).  
 
The  present  paper  confirms  Cukierman’s  remark  by  looking  at  a  rather  different 
aspect of private information, namely, the central bank’s own assessment of private 
sector expectations. We study a case where information is asymmetric in two ways. 
First, in our forward-looking model the private sector has private information  about   2 
its own expectations of future inflation and output. Then, the central bank sets its 
policy based on an imperfect assessment of private sector expectations regarding next 
period’s level of output and inflation. Likewise the private sector can not perfectly 
observe these assessments made by the central bank unless the central bank publishes 
them.  If  it  wishes  the  central  bank  can  provide  information  about  the  way  its 
assessment  is  produced  and  thereby  make  it  easier  for  the  public  to  forecast  the 
assessment errors the central bank is making (see Tarkka and Mayes (1999)). 
The  aim  is  to  investigate  the  effect  of  communication  by  the  central  bank  of  its 
assessment  errors  on  private  sector  expectations  and  macroeconomic  outcomes. 
However, the aim of communication is not to reduce the variance of forecast errors; 
that is fixed by assumption. 
Finally, we look at the effect of communication on the macroeconomic variables that 
we are concerned with in this model: the rate of inflation and the output gap. We find 
that communication about assessment errors of private sector expectations increases 
the volatility of inflation but decreases the volatility of the output gap. 
 
2. The model 
In order to give a prominent role to expectations and communication, we base our 
analysis on a forward-looking IS-LM model, as described by King (2000). 
We have a forward looking Phillips equation that determines inflation: 
  t t t
p
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where  p is the inflation rate,  xis the output gap, and  u is an inflation shock. The 
parameters  b and  l satisfy 1 0 £ £ b  and  0 > l . The superscript p in  1 + t
p
t E p stands 
for private sector expectations. Thus inflation depends on private sector expectations 
of future inflation, the output gap and inflation shock. 
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where  r is the real interest rate and  vis a demand shock. The parameterj satisfies 
0 > j . 
   3 
The current output gap depends on private sector expectations of next period’s output 
gap, the real interest rate and a demand shock. 
Finally, the real interest rate is determined by the Fisher equation, linking the nominal 
interest rate with the real interest rate. 
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where iis the nominal interest rate. Combining (2) and (3) we write the output gap as 
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where  a  is the weight on output stabilization. In other words we are looking for 
optimal discretionary policy where the central bank optimizes period by period by 
taking  as  given  its  assessment  of  private  sector  expectations.  However,  since  the 
central bank has an imperfect assessment of private sector expectations, we write the 
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where central bank’s expectations of the Phillips equation is based on its assessment 
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using the central bank’s assessment of the Phillips curve (7) in optimality condition 
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Combining the IS curve (9) with the optimality condition and the Phillips curve (7) 
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Now, the idea, in the spirit of Tarkka and Mayes (1999), is that the central bank’s 
assessment of private sector expectations about the future output gap and the future 
rate of inflation is imperfect. Evans and Honkapohja (2002) also discuss the issue of 
observability of current private expectations in the context of the adaptive learning 
literature.  They  point  out  that although  survey  data  on  private forecasts  of  future 
inflation and output are available to central banks, there are apparent concerns about 
the accuracy of this data. Although most experts would agree that it is very hard for 
the central bank to accurately measure the public’s expected output gap, opinions 
differ  about  the  extent  to  which  the  central  bank  is  uncertain  about  the  public 
inflationary  expectations  (see,  however,  Mankiw,  Reis  and  Wolfers,  2003).  We 
choose a general setup, where the central bank makes an assessment error in both 
private sector inflationary expectations and private sector output gap expectations. 
However, the variances of these errors may be different. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
1 We get the optimality condition (6) by minimizing the expected value of (5) subject to the central 
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where  superscript  c  stands  for  central  bank’s  expectations  of  private  sector 
expectations and superscript p stands for private sector expectations. The assessment 
errors  follow  an  AR(1)  process  t t t w w h r + = -1   where  the  innovations  are 
independent  and  normally  distributed  ) , 0 ( ~
2
h s h N t   and    is  a  measure  for  the 
persistence  of  the  assessment errors.  The  central  bank’s  assessment errors  can  be 
persistent because the central bank only sluggishly adjusts its procedures. 
 
 
3. Information transmission through a limited capacity channel 
In our model, the central bank is a rational agent that minimizes its loss-function, 
using all the information that is available. Therefore, the central bank does not know 
the realization of its assessment errors. However, it can communicate to the public the 
procedure that it uses to assess private sector expectations. When the private sector 
understands this procedure, it will be able to find out the forecast error, although it 
cannot influence the size of the forecast error. 
By applying information theory as developed by Shannon (1948), Sims (1998, 2003) 
has  studied  the  effects  of  constrained  information  processing  on  the  behavior  of 
macroeconomic time series. Adam (2003) uses the information channel concept to 
look at optimal monetary policy when firms have private information about shocks 
hitting  the  economy.  We  apply  the  same  concept  to  expectation  formation  in  a 
monetary  policy  framework  where  the  central  bank  communicates  about  its 
assessment of expectations to the public through an information channel with limited 
capacity. 
The central bank communicates with the public about the model it uses to assess 
private sector expectations through a channel with limited capacity. In the model, the 
central bank sends a signal w over a channel with limited capacity C and the receiver 
(i.e. the public) observes the signal with noise e . The public observes W: 
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where  ) , 0 ( ~
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w t N w s
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e s e N t  and wt and et are independent. 
 
In order to model the information channel with limited capacity, we define a measure 
of  uncertainty  of  a  random  variable,  called  entropy.  This  measure  has  several 
attractive  properties  compared  to  other  measures  of  uncertainty  (see  Cover  and 
Thomas, 1991 for a textbook treatment). The entropy for the input wt is defined as (we 
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where p(w) is the probability density function of w, which we choose to be normal. 
The entropy of the stochastic variable w is an increasing function of its variance 
2
w s . 
Based on this definition we compute the conditional and unconditional entropy of 
output signal W. 
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Unless variables w and W are independent, conditioning reduces the entropy. The 
information  about  w  obtained  by  observing  W,  denoted  by  I(w,  W),  is  called  the 
mutual information. Using a basic theorem from information theory (see, for instance, 
Cover and Thomas, 1991) we can write the following expression: 
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= w . Here we have made the simplifying assumption that the world starts at t. If this 
is not the case, the public receives information about the innovation and the part of the noise that is 
carried over from last period. Then, the input signal will be  1 - - = t t t w re h  with 
) , 0 ( ~
2 2 2
e h s r s + N wt . This has no implications for qualitative results.   7 
 
In words, the amount of uncertainty reduction for the two jointly distributed variables 
is the same whether we use observations on W to infer about w or vice versa. Of 
course, in our model we are interested in the first equality because the public uses 
observations on W to inform itself about the input signal w. But this theorem allows us 
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s w . The larger the variance of the noise, the lower the mutual 
information. 
The capacity of the channel is defined as its maximum mutual information. Since 
communication  goes  through  a  channel  with  limited  capacity  C,  the  maximum 
reduction in entropy that can be achieved by communicating is C: 
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When we assume that capacity is used to the maximum, the capacity constraint is 
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This equation (14) shows us that the variance of the communication error is a negative 
function of the capacity of the communication channel. 
                                                 
3 From equation (12) it is easier to compute the conditional probability distribution for W|w than for 
w|W.   8 
The intuition behind this result is that given the variability of the actual assessment 
error w, larger information transmission capacity reduces the magnitude of the noisy 
part in the observed assessment error W. In the extreme, with infinite capacity of the 
information channel (C®¥) the variance of the noise goes to zero and the receiver 
observes  the  central  bank’s  signal  about  the  assessment  errors  without  noise.  In 
economic terms, the public perfectly understands the central bank’s assessment of 
private sector expectations. If, on the other hand, capacity tends to zero the variance 
of the noise tends to infinity. In that case, the uncertainty about w after observing W 
equals the uncertainty of w before observing W, so that the observation of W adds no 
information at all. With a low capacity, the noise dominates the signal. 
 
 
4. Expectation formation 
As  described  above  in  equation  (12)  the  public  receives  an  output-signal  W  that 
indicates this period' s assessment error. With this signal, the agent solves a standard 
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So, communication by the central bank that is received by the private sector contains 
a noise term e and is weighted with a factor 0 £ K £1 that depends on the capacity of 
the communication channel. 
 
5. Inserting the communication channel into the model 
We solve the model by applying the method of undetermined coefficients (see e.g. 
McCallum (1983)).  
                                                 
4 For an early application of signal-extraction to economics see Lucas (1973).   9 
First  for  the  output  gap  and  inflation  rate  we  conjecture  that  they  depend  on  the 
assessment  errors,  the  inflation  shock,  the  demand  shocks  and  the  noise  that  is 
introduced by the limited capacity channel: 
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Then from these follow private sector expectations. The only information that the 
private sector has is the signal about the assessment errors W and the AR(1)-structure 
of the assessment errors. This signal is used to form expectations about the future 
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Essential here is that the public, using the signal of today’s error and its persistence, is 
able to forecast the error that the central bank is going to make in the next period. 
 
The interest rate rule (10) will now be 
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Using (18) and (19) in (20) we can express the interest rate as a function of structural 
parameters and shocks. 
 
Then, output and inflation will be  
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Using  (18),  (19)  and  (20)  in  (21)  and  (22)  and  then  solving  for  undetermined 
coefficients  to  make  (21)  and  (22)  consistent  with  (16)  and  (17)  gives  us  the 
expressions for B11-B36. (see appendix) 
 
Coefficients B11, B12, B21, B22 are all positive, indicating  that the  existence  of 
assessment errors makes inflation and the output gap more volatile. For small values 
of  K,  however,  the  coefficients  B31  and  B32  are  negative.  This  means  that  an 
underestimation of, for instance, inflationary expectations (positive assessment error) 
makes policy too lax, which is also what one would expect. 
To  analyze  the  effect  of  communication,  we  look  at  the  first  derivatives  of  the 
coefficients with respect to K. We find that the coefficients B11, B12, B15 and B16 in 
the output equation decrease monotonically with communication, while B21, B22, 
B25, B26 in the inflation equation as well as those for the interest rate equation - B31, 
B32, B35, and B36 increase monotonically with communication. That means that the 
output  gap  and  the  interest    rate  (for  K  small)  become  less  volatile  with 
communication, whereas the inflation rate becomes more volatile. 
 
 
6. Social welfare and communication 
In  order  to  analyze  the  effect  of  communication  by  the  central  bank  about  the 
assessment errors, we use a loss function that punishes deviations of the inflation rate, 
output gap and interest rate from its target value zero. We allow for the possibility that 
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where  a and  q are  society’s  weights  on  output  and  interest  rate  stabilization 
respectively.    11 
For the analysis of the welfare effects of communication, we look separately at the 
assessment errors for the expected output gap and the expected rate of inflation and 
we disregard the inflation and demand shocks u and v. 
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In this case, given the central bank’s preferences, if the society cares much about 
output stabilization communication turns out to be welfare enhancing.
5 
The intuition behind this results is as follows. With a positive assessment error, the 
central bank underestimates the expected future output gap and rate of inflation. The 
policy it has planned is therefore too loose and the interest rate it plans to set too low. 
If the public is aware of the fact that the procedure used by the central bank leads to 
an  underestimation  of  the  expected  output  gap  and  inflation  (i.e.  this  error  is 
communicated)  the  public  will  expect  a  positive  assessment  error  next  period 
(because  of  persistence  in  the  error).  It  will  therefore  have  a  higher  inflationary 
expectation.  This is  picked-up by the policymaker (still with an assessment error, 
though)  and  it  makes  policy  tighter  than  without  communication.  The  opposite 
reasoning holds for a negative assessment error. 
Note that the parameters for the interest rate equation are negative. The increase in the 
parameters for this equation mean less interest volatility. 
 
Since the coefficients either monotonically decrease or monotonically increase, it is 
sufficient to consider only the extreme cases of no communication  0 = K and full 
communication  1 = K . 
                                                 
5 This is a situation where the central bank decides on interest rate policy based on its own weight on 
output stabilizationa while the society assigns a higher weight on output stabilization  a > a . Thus 
given a  we can assign a value for a such that communication is worthwhile for the society’s welfare. 
   12 
 
Proposition 1: If the public has no preference for interest rate stabilization (q =0), 
and  the  policymaker  is  sufficiently  conservative  communication  about  the  central 
bank’s assessment errors improves welfare. It is welfare improving to communicate 
the assessment error of inflation expectations and/or the assessment error of output 
gap expectations if: 
1
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The intuition behind this result is as follows. The positive effect of communication on 
stabilization of the output gap is stronger when the central bank is conservative (a 
low). On the other hand stabilization of the output gap contributes more to social 
welfare if society puts more weight on output gap stabilization (a  large). 
 
As an extension of the above analysis, we ask under what conditions communication 
turns out to be welfare improving when society’s welfare depends on the variability of 
inflation,  output  and  the  nominal  interest  rate.  The  new  element  is  that  now  the 
society has an additional goal, namely, the nominal interest rate.
6 For this purpose let 
us fix  a  such that  a
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7  That means under the case 
without additional interest rate goal for the society (i.e. q =0), communication would 
not  affect  social  welfare.    Proposition  2  gives  the  condition  under  which 
communication  improves  social  welfare  when we  allow  the  society  to  care about 
interest rate stabilization.  
 
                                                 
6 For discussions interest rate stabilization as related to instability in financial markets and financial 
crises, see for example Cukierman (2001, p. 61) and the references there in. 
7 Note that with this assumption the central bank is at least as conservative as the public since  a ³ a .   13 
Proposition 2: Suppose the public has a preference for interest rate stabilization (i.e. 
q >0). Suppose also  a
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a , so that the central bank is 
sufficiently conservative (but to a lesser extent than when q =0). Then communication 
about the central bank’s assessment errors improves social welfare if: 
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Proof:  Since  the  condition  in  proposition  1  holds  with  equality,  social  welfare 
increases  if  and  only  if  the  nominal  interest  rate  is  less  volatile  with  better 
communication. It is then easy to show that the equilibrium nominal interest rate is 
less volatile with better communication if and only if the above condition is satisfied.   
 
Note  that  the  right  hand  side  of  this  inequality  condition  is  positive.  Given  our 
assumption that  0 > j , what the condition requires is that j  should not be too large. 
This makes sense since the effect of more communication on the variability of interest 
rate  depends  on  the  degree  to  which  private  sector  expectations  of  next  period’s 
inflation and output respond to the current assessment errors (see the central bank’s 
reaction function (20)). It turns out that as j  gets smaller, private sector expectations 
of  output  and inflation (see equations (18)  and (19)) respond  less strongly  to the 
(current) assessment error on inflation expectations.  
 
Proposition  3:  Communication  about  the  assessment  error  will  increase  optimal 
conservatism of the central bank if the persistence of the assessment error on the 
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The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that increased communication (from the zero 
level)  improves  stabilization  of  the  output  gap.  Therefore,  better  communication 
(larger K) makes it optimal for the central bank to become more conservative (smaller 
). Note that under the benchmark case  0 = q , Proposition 3 requires no relevant 
restrictions on the persistence parameter  r  since in that case we would have that 
¥ < <
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7. Concluding remarks 
It is sometimes argued that central banks need to be secretive in order to maintain 
flexibility.  This  flexibility  enables  central  banks  to  stabilize  the  economy.  In  a 
standard New-Keynesian model we arrive at an opposite result. By communicating 
and being transparent about procedures that lead to assessment errors of private sector 
expectations on inflation and the output gap, the central bank is better able to stabilize 
the output gap than when its assessment errors come as a surprise to the public. The 
inflation rate, however, will become more volatile. The reason is that the public’s 
reaction to the errors will cause the bank to adjust its interest rate in the direction that 
helps to stabilize the impact of the error on the output gap. 
A crucial element in our analysis is that, with communication by the central bank, the 
public is able to forecast the error that the central bank will make in assessing private 
sector expectations. 
In  our  welfare  analysis  we  showed  that  a  sufficiently  conservative  central  bank 
improves  society’s  welfare  by  communicating  its  assessment  of  private  sector 
expectations.  This  holds  in  the  benchmark  case  where  society  cares  only  about 
inflation and output stabilization and in a case where we allow the society to have 
interest rate stabilization goal on top of inflation and output.   
Furthermore, we analyzed the relationship between communication and central bank 
conservativeness.  It  turns  out  that  when  the  assessment  errors  on  output  gap 
expectations are not too persistent, a central bank deciding to be more transparent   
can afford to be more conservative since the benefits from higher transparency in 
terms of output stabilization are greater the more conservative the central bank is.    15 
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We conjecture the following structure for the output gap, the inflation rate, the 
nominal interest rate, the output gap expected by the public and the inflation rate 
expected by the public. 
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Then, the real interest rate will have the following structure: 
 
x
t t t t
x
t t t KB B KB B v B u B w KB B w KB B r e r e r r r
p p ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 21 36 21 35 34 33 22 32 21 31 - + - + + + - + - =
 
From our model, it follows that the nominal interest rate will look like this: 
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t t v E i x E x + + - = + + 1 1 p j j           (21) 
t t t
p
t t u x E + + = + l p b p 1             (22)  
Solving for undetermined coefficients we get the following results: 
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